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A steep decline in biologically based racial animus over the past four decades has not led to a softening of opposition to
race-conscious policies such as affirmative action. One explanation for this is that a new racial belief system—referred to
as symbolic racism or racial resentment—has replaced “old-fashioned racism.” Another is that nonracial values such as
ideology and a preference for small government now drive policy opinions. Our theory suggests that whereas disgust once
accompanied ideas about “biologically inferior” groups, anger has become fused to conservative ideas about race in the
contemporary period. As a result, anger now serves as the primary emotional trigger of whites’ negative racial attitudes.
We experimentally induce disgust, anger, or fear using an apolitical task and find anger is uniquely powerful at boosting
opposition to racially redistributive policies among white racial conservatives. Nonracial attitudes such as ideology and
small government preference are not activated by any of these negative emotions.
Asteep decline over the past 40 years in the be-lief that blacks are biologically different than,and inferior to, whites (Schuman et al. 1997)
has not been accompanied by an increase in support for
public policies intended to promote equal opportunity,
such as affirmative action. A collection of “new racism”
theories—including symbolic racism (Sears and Kinder
1971), racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and
modern racism (McConahay and Hough 1976; referred
to hereafter as SR)—acknowledges that whites’ “old-
fashioned racism” (OFR) has genuinely receded over time
in both prevalence and influence. In its place, a new racial
belief system has emerged, rooted in an organic synthesis
of antiblack affect and the sense that blacks violate cher-
ished American values such as individualism (Kinder and
Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003).
The politics-centered approach (Sniderman, Crosby,
and Howell 2000), on the other hand, insists these new
racism theories overestimate the role of racial animus.
Instead, they argue, race-neutral values (RNV) regarding
the proper size and role of government, political ideol-
ogy, and individualism drive racial policy opinions. This
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criticism focuses on two related dimensions. First, Sni-
derman and his colleagues contest the claim that a funda-
mental change underlying the meaning of negative racial
attitudes has taken place, and thus they question whether
OFR and SR are conceptually distinct (see, for exam-
ple, Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). Second, these authors
argue that measures of SR are contaminated with nonra-
cial values such as individualism or preference for small
government. These nonracial values, not racism, explain
contemporary opposition to racially redistributive poli-
cies (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000).
Studies testing these competing hypotheses remain
inconclusive, because all three dimensions—OFR, SR,
and RNV—are correlated with each other and with pol-
icy opinions. The debate, then, often reduces to subjective
characterizationsof the explainedvarianceof eachdimen-
sion. We hope to move this debate forward by theorizing
about the emotional substrates of eachdimension. If these
attitudes are indeed unique antecedents of racial policy
opinions, they might be linked to unique emotional re-
actions in the minds of average citizens. Therefore, we
propose moving a step back to consider whether distinct
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emotional antecedents of these racial belief systems exist.
If so, then the debate is not simply a matter of proper
measurement and model specification.
Our results have important implications for the racial
policy opinion debate. First, to foreshadow the findings,
our article supports the notion that SR is indeed concep-
tually distinct from OFR: biologically based beliefs about
racial differences are linked to the emotion of disgust,
while contemporary racial animus is not. Instead, SR is
rooted in blame appraisals and, consequently, anger. Sec-
ond, fear is not found to be powerfully linked to any of
the belief systems examined here: experiencing fear does
not boost opposition to racial redistribution among those
high in SR, OFR, or RNV. Finally, RNV such as a pref-
erence for limited government or the belief in individual
achievement are not activated by any negative emotion
and therefore are distinct from both SR and OFR.
Emotions and the Evolution fromOld
to New Racism
The intuition that negative racial beliefs are coincident
with strong negative emotions is not new. Proponents of
the OFR, SR, and RNV hypotheses all suggest negative
emotions accompany, if not drive, these dimensions. A
simple “valence” approach, conceptually grouping nega-
tive emotions together, is often employed. For example,
Kinder and Sears (1981) posit “symbolic racism is rooted
in . . . early learned racial fears” and Sears later contends
antiblack affect is “experienced subjectively as fear, avoid-
ance, and a desire for distance, anger, distaste, disgust,
contempt, apprehension, unease, or dislike” (1988, 70).
The politics-centered approach also acknowledges that
opinions about race are highly emotionally charged (Sni-
derman, Crosby, andHowell 2000), but does not focus on
specific emotions. Fear is assumed to underlie the con-
cept of ethnocentrism—a generalized negative attitude
toward those unlike ourselves (Kam and Kinder 2007).
Many scholars suggest campaign strategists actively em-
ploy negative emotions as a tool to race bait (Olbermann,
2010; Reeves 1997; Toner 2006). Jamieson argues cam-
paigns via racialized ads “play to whispered fears, preju-
dices privately held but publicly denied” (1992, 84).
To date, however, there has been very little atten-
tion devoted to the causal role of emotions in any of
these belief systems. We suspect the emotional substrates
of these attitudes are both powerful and more specific
than previously recognized. We posit that emotions be-
come linked to racial predispositions as a result of the
dominant emotional tenor of political debates in a given
historical period. When the link between emotion and
ideas about race is strong, experiencing the emotion can
activate the belief and thus cause a shift in support for
relevant policies.
So which emotions should be linked to the OFR, SR,
and RNV belief systems? Appraisal theories of emotion
posit that emotional reactions in a given situation depend
on the particular explanations individuals use to make
sense of events in their lives (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).
Emotions spring from relationships between the individ-
ual and her environment that involve threat or opportu-
nity (Lazarus 1991). Lazarus (1991) identifies two types of
appraisals. Primary appraisals determine whether an en-
counter is congruent with one’s goals. This appraisal trig-
gers positive or negative affect and occurs immediately,
even prior to conscious thought. A negative affective reac-
tion occurs when an event interferes with our goals, while
positive affect occurs when the event seems to bolster the
chance of success. Once this initial appraisal occurs, a
secondary appraisal determines the cause and nature of
the harm/benefit. This secondary process refines negative
affect intomore specific emotions such as anger, fear, and
disgust.1 It is on this secondary appraisal process that we
focus our attention.
Appraisals of physical contamination are essential to
experiencing disgust. Rozin and Fallon describe the dis-
gust reaction as “revulsion at the prospect of (oral) in-
corporation of an offensive object. The offensive objects
are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly contact an
acceptable food, they tend to render the food unaccept-
able” (1987, 23). Lazarus reasons that disgust indicates “a
strong desire to keep the substance away to preserve one’s
bodily integrity” (1991, 260). In other words, core disgust
is a reaction to a specific type of threat, one that might
poison or contaminate the body.Moreover, humans seem
to experience disgust reactions not only from bodily con-
tamination, but also from moral transgressions (Lazarus
1991).
According to appraisal theory, anger occurs when
there is certainty about the source of a threat and blame
is clearly established (Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Tiedens
2006). Further, the degree to which an individual feels
she has control over the offending situation can en-
hance angry reactions (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Fi-
nally, fear occurs when threats cannot be controlled or
1A growing literature indicates even these secondary processes may
occur very soon after exposure to a stimulus, perhaps even before
the mind is conscious of many details about the threat (Damasio
1994; Gray 1987). This is the intuition underlying Affective Intelli-
gence Theory (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). We cannot
pinpoint the precise timing of emotional experience with our data,
so we remain agnostic on this point.
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when there is uncertainty about how to address them
(Huddy et al. 2005; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). So how
might these appraisals map onto specific racial belief
systems?
A hallmark of the OFR belief system is the presumed
biological inferiority of blacks (Kinder and Sanders 1996;
Sears 1988). Stereotypes of blacks as subhuman were of-
ten explicit in the cultural dialogue of the Reconstruc-
tion era (Mendelberg 2001). Popular rhetoric suggested
blacks were morally and biologically deficient, animal-
like, dirty, and unintelligent (Blake andDennis 1943; Kar-
lins, Coffman, and Walters 1969; Katz and Braly 1933).
High rates of poverty, criminality, and illiteracy were seen
as evidence that citizenship rights were inappropriate for
blacks. Strict separation of the races was deemed essential
for maintaining the physical and moral “purity” of the
white race (Fredrickson 1971). In fact, Cuddy, Fiske, and
Glick (2007) provide some preliminary evidence for the
automatic linkage between group stereotypes and feelings
of disgust. Therefore, we expect the small minority who
continue to score highly on OFR to be moved by disgust.
Our reading of contemporary debates about race in
America led us to suspect the SR belief system is linked
more strongly to anger than disgust or fear. While the be-
lief that blacks are innately inferior has declined, many
whites still suspect blacks choose not to try as hard.2
Mendelberg (2001) and Valentino, Hutchings, andWhite
(2002) suggest a similar transformation has occurred in
political communication: racial appeals that once argued
blacks arebiologically inferiorhavebeen replacedby those
involving blacks’ motivation and work ethic. If blacks are
considered equal in ability, this perceived lack of moti-
vation leads to blame. According to appraisal theories of
emotion, this attribution is essential for anger. In other
words, new racism is situated in the belief that blacks are
to blame for their owndisadvantages (Kinder and Sanders
1996; Sears and Kinder 1971), and this is likely to trig-
ger anger. Of course, the threat of resource redistribution
fromwhite to black communitiesmayprompt fear among
whites, as group position theory (Blumer 1958; Bobo and
Hutchings 1996) and the power-threat hypothesis (Key
1949) suggest. If so, then fear may in fact be most power-
fully linked to SR. However, we do not see contemporary
discussions of race as infused with uncertainty or a lack
of control: the appraisals most often linked to fear. As a
result, fear should not boost opposition to racial policies
2Of course, the laziness stereotype may overlap both OFR and SR
belief systems, since some might believe dispositional differences
between blacks and whites are innate. Consistent with this is the
Huddy and Feldman (2009) argument that SR is a mixture of
internal and external attributions.
among those high in any of these racial or nonracial belief
systems.
If contemporary discussions about race are domi-
nated by blame rhetoric, anger will become powerfully
fused to the SR belief system. Subsequently, for those
high in SR, the experience of anger may trigger negative
thoughts about blacks that will subsequently boost op-
position to racially redistributive policies. DeSteno and
colleagues observe such an effect: subjects induced to feel
angry rate arbitrary outgroups more negatively (DeSteno
et al. 2004). Mackie, Devos, and Smith’s (2000) work on
intergroup emotions reveals similar results. Individuals
who appraise their ingroup as strong and powerful re-
act with anger (not fear or disgust) and endorse action
against outgroups. Might a similar process cause anger to
become linked to RNV, such as preference for small gov-
ernment, individualism, or nonracial ideological identi-
ties? The politics-centered approach suggests people op-
pose racial policies such as affirmative action not because
the recipients are black, but because they require large and
inefficient government bureaucracies, or they undermine
individual initiative. Violating these values via govern-
ment policy could generate anger if people believe blacks
are intentionally demanding unfair treatment in compar-
ison to other groups. For example, Sniderman, Crosby,
and Howell (2000) find most whites (both liberals and
conservatives) are angry or upset by the phrase “black
leaders asking for affirmative action.” If these nonracial
values drive resistance to racially redistributive policies,
anger should also powerfully primeRNVandboost oppo-
sition to affirmative action among those highonmeasures
of that belief system. Such an outcome would leave us in
an indeterminate position. We would still not know if
SR and RNV are distinct, because they would not have
distinct emotional triggers.
Once the linkage between an emotion and a group
attitude has been established, the experience of that emo-
tion may activate, or prime, the predisposition. Bower’s
(1981) state-dependent theory of memory posits that
emotion is instrumental in learning and recall. Informa-
tion learned in one emotional state is more easily recalled
when subjects are returned to that state. If our specula-
tions about the dominant emotional underpinnings of
specific racial attitudes are correct, then distinct belief
systems should be primed when the linked emotion is
experienced. As a result, those who hold these beliefs
strongly should increasingly oppose racially redistribu-
tive policies. Our primary hypothesis, therefore, is that
the experience of anger, even when generated by a non-
political stimulus, will boost opposition to racial policies
among those high in SR. If the politics-centered approach
is correct, anger should also have this effect for those high
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in nonracial values such as preference for small govern-
ment. Second, we expect disgust (but not other negative
emotions) will lead whites high in OFR to oppose racially
redistributive policies.
We test these expectations in two ways. First, we use
an experiment to independently induce negative emo-
tions using a nonpolitical task. This study provides a pre-
cise test of the causal mechanism we think is at work
in activating particular belief systems during racial pol-
icy opinion formation. A second test utilizes the 1985
American National Election Study (ANES) pilot study
that contained measures of a wide variety of emotions
and racial attitudes. These results are consistent with the
experimental findings and strengthen the external validity
of our inferences.
Study 1
An experiment was run through Polimetrix/YouGov, an
Internet survey company, fromApril 21 to April 30, 2008.
Polimetrix/YouGov uses amatching technique to draw its
adult sample. Respondents are matched to the national
population on gender, age, race, education, party identifi-
cation, andpolitical interest. The total sample sizewas 243
whites.3 Therewas substantial variation on age (26%were
18–34; 38% were 35–54; 36% were 55 and over), gender
(48% female), and education (43% high school degree or
less; 30% some college; 18% college graduate). An over-
sample of the South (128 respondents) was included in
order to increase variation inOFR, since this belief system
is more prevalent in Southern states (Valentino and Sears
2005).4 As a result of the oversample, the samplewasmore
likely than the nation to identify as Republican (49%) and
conservative (49%).5 The random assignment of subjects
to conditions was successful: there were no significant
differences across cells of the design in the proportion
of sociodemographic or partisan variables. As a result,
any differences in the poststimulus dependent measures
can be attributed to the manipulation and not to other
factors.
The experiment was conducted in two waves. This is
an important, though costly, design choice. Many similar
3Seven subjects were dropped from the analysis because they failed
to follow instructions. None of the results change substantively if
these respondents are included.
4We did find white Southerners to be more racially conservative
than white Northerners.
5We do not employ weights, since our goal is to estimate the effect
of themanipulation.Weights are randomly distributed across cells,
and inferences are unchanged when they are used.
studies measure the primed dimension in the posttest,
because researchers fear the pretest measure may itself
activate thoughts about the group, thus eliminating any
experimental effects. However, tapping racial attitudes in
the posttest carries a different risk: that the stimulus itself
will lead to changes in the primeddimension.Apreferable
design is to measure the racial attitudes in a pretest far
enough in advance that it is unlikely to remain salient
by the time the individual is exposed to the stimulus in
the second wave.6 As a result, we measured attitudes a
week prior to exposure to our emotion induction task.
The first wave consisted of racial and general attitudes
measures, i.e., SR, OFR, and RNV (including ideology,
individualism, and size of government). Seven days later,
respondents participated in Wave 2, which consisted of
the manipulation followed by measures of racial policy
opinions.
Experimental Manipulation
The experimental manipulation utilized two induction
techniques common in psychological studies of emo-
tion (Bower 1981; Ekman 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2001;
Valentino et al. 2008). Subjects were asked to recall and
focus on events, people, or occurrences that led them
to experience a given emotion while viewing an image
of a person with a facial expression corresponding to
that emotion.7 The combination of written and visual
stimuli ensures respondents experience distinct negative
emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, and fear). Facial expressions
havebeen shown to trigger the sameemotion in the viewer
(Ekman 1993). Subjects were asked via the computer to
respond to the following query:8
Here is a picture of someone who is (AN-
GRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED).Wewould like you
to describe in general things that make you feel
like the person in the picture. It is okay if you
6If some respondents were turned off by the measures of racial
attitudes in the pretest, they might opt out of the second wave.
This could dampen effects. Fortunately, mortality was equivalent
across cells of the design. There was a recontact success rate of
60%, and there were no biases across conditions on variables such
as partisanship, education, and gender.
7The facial images were of the same middle-aged white woman.
The pictures, displayed in the appendix, are drawn from Ekman’s
archive of emotional expressions (Ekman and Friesen 1976).
8For the relaxed condition, there was no image. The text for this
condition was exactly the same as for the other conditions except
the emotional label was replaced with the word “relaxed.” A full
description is available in the online supplementary information.
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don’t remember all the details, just be specific
about what exactly it is thatmakes you (ANGRY/
AFRAID/DISGUSTED) and what it feels like to
be (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED). Please de-
scribe the events that make you feel the MOST
(ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED), these experi-
ences could have occurred in the past or will
happen in the future. If you can, write your de-
scription so that someone reading it might even
feel (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED).
Our technique does not focus the respondent’s at-
tention on politics or race. It is, therefore, a precise test
of the hypothesis that emotions themselves can activate
specific group-based belief systems. Had we asked the re-
spondent to focus on political objects that caused him or
her to experience specific emotions, one concern would
be that thoughts about those objects, not the emotions
they cause, were responsible for the changes we observe
in policy views. Response length to the emotional prompt
was unrestricted, but subjects were told to take a fewmin-
utes to write down anything in general that made them
feel the intended emotion. After the induction, subjects
completed a posttest questionnaire that included a variety
of policy-opinion measures.
Results
First, we conducted a manipulation check to determine
if the induction procedure operated as expected. Open-
ended responses to the induction task were double-coded
by two trained graduate students unaware of the hypothe-
ses. They identified the intensity of any negative emotions
expressed in the responses (the scale ranged from 0 to 1,
0 = none, .5 = some, and 1 = extreme).9 The results
of the manipulation check are presented in Table 1. As
expected, participants in the anger condition expressed
significantly more intense anger than those in the control
(relaxed) condition, but did not express more fear or dis-
gust. Correspondingly, respondents in the fear condition
expressed more fear, but not more anger or disgust rela-
tive to the control. Participants in the disgust condition
expressed more disgust, but also slightly more anger than
the control. Coders correctly identified the fear expres-
sion 88% of the time, and 100% correctly identified the
anger and disgust expressions. These results indicate that
the induction performed as intended. The slightly over-
lapping experience of anger and disgust is not surprising,
9The reliability of our coders was high: Cronbach’s alpha for
anger = .85, fear = .93, and disgust = .87.
TABLE 1 Manipulation Check
Intensity Intensity Intensity
of Anger of Fear of Disgust
Expressed Expressed Expressed
B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.)
Anger Condition .51∗∗∗ .01 .02
(.04) (.03) (.04)
Fear Condition .03 .48∗∗∗ .00
(.04) (.03) (.04)
Disgust Condition .13∗∗∗ .01 .44∗∗∗
(.04) (.03) (.04)
Constant .01 .00 .01
(.03) (.02) (.02)
N 241 241 241
∗p ≤ .1; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .001 (all by two-tailed test). Entries
are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, and the standard
errors are in parentheses.
given how often these emotions co-occur in real life. This
result provides a more conservative test of our hypothe-
ses about the distinctive links between each emotion and
various attitude dimensions.
To measure SR, we used Kinder and Sanders’s (1996)
four-itemANES battery.10 We created a scale of racial pol-
icy opinions covering a broad spectrum of economic and
symbolic remedies to eliminate racial inequalities by sum-
ming responses to five items. The items include support
for affirmative action, busing , government assistance to
blacks,Confederate flag displays, and official observance of
theMartin Luther King Jr. Holiday. The items scale nicely
(Cronbach’s alpha = .75). The exact question wording is
located in the online supplementary information.
We predict the experience of anger will significantly
boost opposition to racial policies among those high in
SR. If so, the interaction between the anger condition and
SR in a regression should be positive. We regressed racial
policy opinions on emotion dummies (Anger, Disgust ,
and Fear), SR, and the interaction between the two, con-
trolling for Ideology, Education, Income, South, Political
discussion, and Age.11 Column 1 of Table 2 shows evi-
dence consistent with these predictions. The interaction
between anger and SR is in the expected direction and is
substantively large. Neither fear nor disgust significantly
boosts SR’s impact on racial policy opinions. Further-
10Full question wording is located in the supplementary
information.
11Political discussion is a measure of political topics subjects men-
tioned in their open-ended responses to the emotion induction.
Controls are described in the supplementary information.
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TABLE 2 The Priming Effect of Emotion for Racial and Nonracial Attitudes
Racial Policies Racial Policies Racial Policies Racial Policies
B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.)
Anger∗Symbolic Racism .32∗∗ .29∗∗
(.14) (.14)
Disgust∗Symbolic Racism .08 .08
(.13) (.14)
Fear∗Symbolic Racism .09 .06
(.12) (.13)
Anger∗Old-Fashioned Racism .57∗∗ .38
(.27) (.24)
Disgust∗Old-Fashioned Racism .49∗∗ .40∗
(.24) (.21)








Anger Condition −.15 .06 .15∗ −.17
(.10) (.05) (.08) (.10)
Disgust Condition −.07 −.04 −.03 −.10
(.10) (.05) (.09) (.10)
Fear Condition −.04 .00 −.01 −.03
(.09) (.05) (.08) (.09)
Symbolic Racism .37∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗
(.09) (.10)




Ideology .17∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .19∗∗ .14∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.08) (.05)
Education −.05 −.15∗∗ −.13∗∗ –.08
(.05) (.06) (.06) (.05)
Income –.07 .03 –.06 –.03
(.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Age .002∗∗ .001 .002∗ .002∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
South .03 .07∗∗ .06∗∗ .03
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Political Discussion −.02 −.10 −.01 −.03
(.15) (.17) (.17) (.15)
Constant .19∗∗ .38∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .24∗∗
(.08) (.07) (.08) (.09)
N 181 172 184 163
∗p ≤ .1; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .001 (all by two-tailed test). Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, and the standard errors are
in parentheses. Variables are coded 0–1, where higher values indicate more opposition to racial policies.
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FIGURE 1 Marginal Effect of Each Emotion on Policy Opinion as
Symbolic Racism Changes
more, the priming effect for anger is statistically larger
than that for either disgust or fear.12
Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of each emo-
tion on racial policy opinions across levels of SR. The fig-
ure displays a 95% confidence interval, in short dashes,
around the marginal effect of anger in the solid line. As
we predict, as SR increases, anger increasingly boosts op-
position to racial policies such as affirmative action. The
marginal effect of fear, in long dashes, and disgust, in
dots, is flat across levels of SR. At high levels of SR, anger
produces significantly higher levels of opposition to racial
policies than do the other emotions.
We also expected disgust to boost opposition to racial
policies among those high in OFR. We measured OFR
with a scale based on three items: (1) “On average blacks
have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.
Do you think these differences are because most blacks
have less in-born ability to learn?” (2) “Blacks come from
a less able race and this explains why blacks are not as well
off as whites in America,” and (3) “How strongly would
you object if a member of your family had a close re-
lationship with a black person?” Column 2 of Table 2
displays a significant interaction between disgust and
OFR on the racial policy index. Contrary to our expec-
12The difference (F, 1, 168, 2.62) is significant at the .1 level be-
tween anger∗SR and fear∗SR (two-tailed test). For anger∗SR and
disgust∗SR, the difference (F, 1, 168, 2.58) is significant at the .11
level (two-tailed test).
tation, the impact of OFR on racial policy opinions was
also significantly higher for those in the anger condition
compared to those in the control group. In fact, the in-
teraction between OFR and anger was slightly, though
not significantly, stronger than that for OFR and disgust.
Therefore, anger and disgust both seem to trigger OFR.
Figure 2 displays these interactions visually and shows
that the effects of anger and disgust are larger than that
of fear, but these differences are not as large or statis-
tically distinct. However, as OFR increases, both anger
and disgust boost opposition to racial policies. At very
high levels of OFR, both anger and disgust boost opposi-
tion significantly more than that in the (relaxed) control
group.
In column 3 of Table 2, we examine the emotional
underpinnings of an RNV, preference for limited gov-
ernment. If this value represents the primary driver of
racial policy opinions, anger should also move opinions
among those high on this dimension. The results in col-
umn 3 provide no support for this expectation. None
of the interactions are substantively large or statistically
significant on racial policy opinions. We replicated these
analyses for two other race-neutral dimensions: nonra-
cial liberal-conservative ideology and individualism.13We
again found no significant interactions.
13Results for the interaction between emotions and ideology and
individualism are available from the authors upon request.
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FIGURE 2 Marginal Effect of Each Emotion on Policy Opinion as
Old-Fashioned Racism Changes
To further assess distinctions between SR and OFR,
we ran an omnibus model including both sets of inter-
actions described above. Researchers have found SR and
OFR both to be driven by internal attributions (Huddy
and Feldman 2009). As a result, we estimated the in-
teraction of each emotion with SR and OFR simultane-
ously. Column 4 shows that SR still interacts only with
anger while disgust now interacts significantly only with
OFR.14 In other words, anger significantly moved opin-
ions among those high in SR, while disgust moved those
high in OFR.15
In summary, the results from Study 1 show that anger
activates SR, while disgust primes OFR. Experiencing
anger, independent of thoughts about race or politics,
powerfully boosted the impact of SR on policy opinions.
Disgust primed OFR, as we had originally predicted, but
anger also activated this belief system as well. Fear did not
activate racial thinking of any kind.
14In another model we included SR, OFR, and RNV (limited gov-
ernment) and interacted each attitude with anger, fear, and disgust.
Results were nearly identical to those reported here.
15We also examined these effects by region. The interactionbetween
anger and racial resentment was strongest in the North (.42, p ≤
.05). The interaction between disgust and OFRwas strongest in the
South (.80, p ≤ .05). This finding suggests SR is more powerfully
linked to anger in the North while it is linked more strongly to
disgust among Southerners.
While the results of Study 1 are supportive of many
of our expectations, we still must be cautious in general-
izing these effects to the national population. The main
threat to external validity in the experiment is the realism
of our manipulation: we directly induced emotions in or-
der to maximize the distinctiveness of our respondents’
reactions. Therefore, we now turn to a survey-based test.
We utilize the 1985 ANES pilot study to test whether a
significant relationship between particular emotions and
predispositions (racial attitudes and race-neutral princi-
ple) can be produced in a nationally representative sample
tapping emotional reactions toward several political at-
titude objects. This survey is useful because it contains
emotion measures for disgust, anger, and fear as well as
racial attitude measures (SR and OFR). For Study 2 we
have two predictions. Anger, but not fear, toward sev-
eral political objects is significantly correlated with SR.
Disgust toward several political objects is significantly
correlated with OFR.
Study 2
Here, we examine multivariate correlations between spe-
cific emotions and the three belief systems examined
above: SR, OFR, and RNV. If our hypotheses are cor-
rect, correlations should be larger between anger and SR
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than with OFR or RNV. We also expect disgust to corre-
late most strongly with OFR, not SR or RNV. The 1985
ANES pilot study is a subsample of 429 participants from
the 1984 ANES, a probability sample of Americans of
voting age containing 392 whites. The study contained
various questions about emotional reactions to affirma-
tive action and race relations as well as to both the Demo-
cratic andRepublican presidential candidates Reagan and
Mondale.16 These measures are much different from the
induction used in Study 1. We constructed scales of emo-
tional states out of all the available emotion items across
a wide range of targets in order to make the most conser-
vative test possible: mean levels of anger across a variety
of topics should be more correlated with SR than mean
levels of other emotions.On theotherhand,weexpectdis-
gust (across this range of targets) should be more closely
linked to OFR, and fear should be linked to neither. Fi-
nally, preference for limited government should not be
strongly correlated with any of these emotions. Note that
if these measures merely tap partisan affect, they should
cancel each other out when we combine evaluations of
opposing parties. The strength of this test comes from
taking the average emotional reaction to all targets, not
simply emotional reactions to an individual’s preferred
candidate or party.
In column1ofTable 3, our expectation finds support.
Whites’Anger is significantly linked to SR, controlling for
Fear, Disgust , Ideology, Party Identification, Southern res-
idence, Education, Age, and Gender. The link between
anger and SR is larger and statistically distinguishable
from that of fear (F, 1, 255, 3.12, p < .10 by a two-tailed
test) and disgust (F, 1, 255, 4.08, p < .05). Neither dis-
gust nor fear is significantly linked to SR. Contrary to our
previous finding, however, column 2 displays no signif-
icant link between disgust and OFR. Finally, consistent
with our expectation, column 3 shows that preference for
Limited government is not correlated with anger, disgust,
or fear.
These results parallel several of our experimental
findings: anger, but not fear or disgust, is uniquely corre-
lated with SR. Preference for limited government is un-
related to any of these emotional dimensions, suggesting
that perhaps the link between anger and contemporary
racial animus is particularly powerful. On the other hand,
contrary to our expectation, we found no correlation be-
tween disgust and OFR.
16Items asked how “preferential treatment to blacks,” “changes
in race relations,” and “presidential candidate Mondale/Reagan”
make the respondent feel. Exact question wording is located in the
supplementary information.
TABLE 3 Multivariate Relationship between




B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.)
Anger .22∗∗∗ .06 .09
(.07) (.07) (.06)
Fear .04 −.01 .02
(.07) (.08) (.07)
Disgust −.01 .00 .01
(.06) (.07) (.06)
Education −.08 −.25∗∗∗ .10∗∗
(.06) (.06) (.05)






Gender .05 .02 −.01
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Age .000 .004∗∗∗ .002∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001)
South −.01 .08∗∗ .03
(.03) (.04) (.03)
Constant .41∗∗∗ .19∗∗ .20∗∗∗
(.06) (.06) (.06)
N 264 275 258
∗p ≤ .1; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .001 (all by two-tailed test). Entries
are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, and the standard
errors are in parentheses. Source: 1985 ANES pilot study.
Discussion
How can we explain the contradiction apparent in a be-
lief in the equality of the races paired with opposition to
policies designed to bring it about? Survey data have long
returned a contested answer: people are motivated either
by racial bias or by principled views of how government
works best. Much of the debate has focused on mea-
surement difficulties: what do contemporary measures of
racial animus such as SR really capture?
Most theories of racial policy opinion formation
assume negative emotions are a critical component of
opposition to racial policies such as affirmative action,
but the emotional driver is rarely examined. Some have
speculated whites feel a blend of negative emotions to-
ward blacks (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988).
Our theory suggests specific emotional substrates activate
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different racial belief systems. We predicted that contem-
porary animus, as indicated by the SR scale, would be
triggered primarily by anger, while OFR would be acti-
vated by disgust.
Our results show that SR is a distinct belief system,
undergirded primarily by anger rather than disgust or
fear. However, in Study 1 we found both disgust and
anger triggered opposition to racial policies among those
high in OFR. Given our interpretations of the kinds of
attributions that might have dominated whites’ thoughts
about race when belief in biological differences was dom-
inant, this is puzzling. One explanation, of course, is that
our interpretations about appraisals taking place among
people high in OFR are incorrect. Such whites may in
fact experience anger in situations where they perceive
an inferior group to be threatening their resources. An-
other possibility is that anger appraisals have found their
way into the OFR belief system only recently. If so, we
would expect both anger and disgust to boost opposition
to racial redistribution among those high in OFR. While
those high in racismmay have once experienced disgust at
the thought of racial intermixing, for example, they may
now feel a mix of anger and disgust about the “demands”
made by blacks embodied by policies such as affirmative
action.
None of the negative emotions we explored boost op-
position to racial policies for those high on RNV such as
a preference for limited government. We suspect the rea-
son is that abstract nonracial principles are simply not as
emotionally charged as are ideas about groups, and thus
they are not primed by the experience of any particular
emotion. It is important to note, however, that the im-
pact of RNV on policy opinion is significant regardless of
the emotion experienced. This suggests racial and non-
racial predispositions are distinct, both conceptually and
in their effect on racial policy opinion. Symbolic racism
is not, then, simply a substitute for nonracial values such
as a preference for small government. Neither, however,
does controlling for SR eliminate the effect of RNV in
these models.
Contrary to much conventional wisdom and schol-
arly speculation, but as we suspected, fear did not prime
OFR, SR, or RNV. Few whites experience a direct loss
of rights or privileges at the hands of blacks, so they are
unlikely to feel a lack of control over personal outcomes
in situations where race is salient. Many who presume
fear is central to whites’ racial attitudes believe racial
prejudice is caused by group competition (Blumer 1958;
Key 1949). While we cannot conclusively rule out that
fear is present in situations where group competition
over concrete rights and resources is salient, we find no
evidence that fear activates opposition to racial redistri-
bution among those high in SR, OFR, or RNV. Further
research is needed to determine whether fear might acti-
vate opposition among those who perceive high levels of
group competition (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings
1996). The central finding bears repeating. When our
subjects experienced anger—even when triggered by a
completely nonpolitical, nonracial induction task—those
high in SR came to oppose affirmative action and other
racial policies. The survey results parallel this finding: the
association between anger and SR was as large and sig-
nificant as expected. On the other hand, there was no
significant association between disgust and OFR in the
survey evidence aswe had found in the experiment.While
this inconsistency casts doubt on our claim about disgust
as the sole emotional substrate of old-fashioned racism,
the differences in measurement of OFR between the two
studies may partly explain the discrepancy. Ourmeasures
of OFR in Study 1 seem to capture more precisely the ap-
praisals that produce disgust: the belief that blacks have
less in-born ability and the objection to a family member
having a personal relationship with a black person.
Although with these data we are unable to identify
when in the lifespan the linkagebetween specific emotions
and specific racial belief systems develops, we suspect it
is probably learned at a young age. It may depend at least
in part on the repeated experience of specific emotions
at the time thoughts about the group are occurring. This
link between discrete emotions and specific racial belief
systems, we believe, dates back to when these attitudes
began to develop. So certain whites are socialized from
an early age to attribute certain emotional responses to
blacks. As a result of this early socialization process, spe-
cific emotions and racial attitudes become fused such that
experiencing the emotion later in adulthood activates the
racial belief.
Barack Obama’s speech entitled “A More Perfect
Union,” in the Constitution Center in Philadelphia on
March 18, 2008, sumsupwell our argument and evidence.
In the speech, condemning Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s
comments about race, Obama stated, “The anger is real,
it is powerful; and to simply wish it away; to condemn it
without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the
chasmofmisunderstanding that exists between the races.”
We agree that neglecting the emotional underpinnings of
contemporary racism can lead us to ignore the perva-
sive role that racism continues to play in modern society.
Myrdal (1944) believed the solutions to the “Negro”prob-
lem were to educate whites and publicize the problem.
While most whites believe racial discrimination has been
eliminated, our findings mandate caution. Racial animus
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partly remains because the primary negative emotion un-
derpinning white attitudes toward blacks—anger—is so
common in everyday life. Public anger surrounding con-
temporary movements like the Tea Party may, therefore,
stem in part from, and trigger, racial prejudice (Parker
and Barreto 2011; Zernike 2010). We think solving the
problemMyrdal laid out over seven decades ago remains
a challenge in contemporary America because it will in-
volve breaking the powerful linkage between anger and
ideas about race.
Appendix: Facial Expressions Used in
Emotion Induction Task
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